

INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT Working Relationship Between
MGB and K-5 in Anklam

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SUPPLEMENT TO
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Introduction: The working relationship established by the MGB with the reportedly "liquidated", "renamed" and "reorganized" K-5 will no doubt be transferred in some form to at least some component parts of the newly organized Sovzon Ministry of State Security (MSS, headed by two Soviet-trained Communists, Wilhelm Zaisser and Erich Mielke). That K-5 was not liquidated in the strict meaning of the term is clear from the present report which states that it still maintained an office in November 1949, at least two months after the "liquidation" date. The same report also states that K-5 at that date had a "new and secret" name.

1. K-5, established to execute Law 201 (crimes against humanity), was organized as a repository for all information on "Fascist and anti-democratic" elements. It first collected all existing files on ex-Nazis and then supplemented and expanded this information by adding names and up-to-date reports on all "reactionary and pro-Western" elements. Each K-5 employee, excepting the clerical help, was charged with establishing his own informant net. Since promotion was based on "activism and evidence of the right democratic spirit" and that, in turn, on the number of informants and information reports produced, K-5 employees were known to work 5-10 extra office hours per day by attending public functions and public gathering places (dancehalls, restaurants, RR stations, larger stores and churches) in order to gather derogatory "information" on Anklam's citizens and to enlist informants who could regularly supply such reports. This activity became even more feverish in midsummer 1949 when word leaked out that K-5 would be re-organized and only those members retained who were unquestionably "activistic", i.e., productive of the most denunciatory reports.

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2. At first K-5 informants were asked only to denounce all ex-Fascists and reactionary elements, but later they were given specific questions and briefings. A characteristic briefing is as follows: Who in Anklam has any sort of contact with the West? Who comes often from Western Germany or from West Berlin to Anklam? Whom do they visit? Can either the visitors

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or the individuals they visit be accused of working for the Americans ("Americans" was an all-inclusive term for all Western Allies)? Who can possibly be accused of espionage or sabotage for the "Americans"? Who from Anklam goes often to Berlin or to Western Germany? Who in Anklam receives mail and newspapers from Western Germany or from West Berlin? Who praises the developments in Western Germany? Do you know of any women in Anklam who now have or have had relations with the Americans? Who desires or plans to flee to Western Germany? Who tells "Hennecke" jokes? Who speaks well of the Marshall Plan? Who listens to the RIAS broadcasts? Who tells others what he or she heard over RIAS? Can you tell us who works or is supposed to work for the Soviets as an informant (this was intended to betray those of the informants who listen to RIAS themselves)? Do people generally believe that those denounced by RIAS actually were Soviet informants? Do people generally believe that war is coming? Who speaks about the coming Third World War as if he wished that it would come? Who says that if the war breaks out the Americans will occupy the Sovzon? Who spreads the rumor that Sovzon men are drafted into a new German Army? Who spreads the rumor that all who sign up for work in the Aue mines are subjected to inhuman treatment and eventually become forced laborers in Russia? - At first it was sufficient to name names and make general assertions, but eventually it was demanded that all answers be either documented or witnesses named.

3. From its origin K-5 was very closely allied with the MGB. It not only collaborated with the MGB but was in effect MGB's informant net. It had no charter except verbal orders of MGB officers. MGB officers visited K-5 HQs several times daily, read all K-5 reports, criticized the work and "suggested" improvements. Each visiting MGB officer would pick up copies of K-5 reports without signing for them, would suggest that certain reports were valueless and should be destroyed; occasionally MGB officers would collect all the existing copies of K-5 reports dealing with more interesting topics and order that all trace of them be removed from the files. MGB officers had access to informant names, and at times would appropriate the better ones for their own use. Other proof that K-5 did not have independent status is the fact that K-5 employees were dismissed, informants dropped and individuals arrested and held without being booked for indefinite periods of time on verbal MGB orders. MGB prisoners arrested by K-5 were kept in cells incommunicado, could not be interrogated by K-5, and relatives of prisoners were never informed that the prisoner was in custody. This heavy MGB hand never embarrassed K-5 officials since everyone was aware that MGB was K-5's parent organization. (Concerning those who were arrested by K-5 on orders of the MGB, it should be mentioned that they were never entered in K-5 records, and were either released on MGB orders without explanation, or removed by the MGB without any trace, sometimes to emerge later as MGB informants).

4. Transfer or dismissal of K-5 personnel during the summer of 1949 left the "reorganized" K-5 in Anklam with only three employees by November 1949: Chief Piether, his assistant Stalinsky and their secretary Frau Hoth. In November 1949 Frau Hoth stated to source that K-5 as such no longer existed, that its new name was secret and, that it was now directly under the orders of the SMA (?) in Schwerin (Mecklenburg) instead of being, as before, under the Greifswald command. Frau Hoth also stated that the new organization, in addition to maintaining the old files, was engaged principally in providing anti-sabotage and anti-espionage protection to the Volkseigene Betriebe and in controlling the issuance of interzonal passes. Of the former Anklam K-5 members, Willy Nagel reportedly serves as MGB informant in some other part of the Russian Zone, Kurt Will was transferred

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to Greifswald, and the secretaries, Frl. Gerda Fensch, Frl. Friedel Haack, Frl. Gisela Brandt and Frl. Eva Specht, were dismissed. The former K-5 in Anklam is located next to the Anklam police station on Stettinerlandstrasse 60 (?).

5. K-5's controlling agency, MGB Group, is located in Anklam across the street from K-5, at Stettinerlandstrasse 66. It is estimated that the staff consists of some 15 officers and 20 enlisted men (they wear the regular MVD green caps). Not all MGB officers work at the Stettinerlandstrasse 66 address; some are located in the Soviet Komendaatura next to the Anklam police station (Stettinerlandstrasse 55-60).

MGB informants differ from K-5 informants in that they are paid up to 100 DM per month, have to sign a statement to the effect that they obligate themselves to work for the Soviet army, to keep their work confidential and to acknowledge that in case of violation of their orders they are subject to Soviet army punitive laws. Each MGB informant is assigned a code name with which he signs his reports. Reports of regular MGB informants are never oral but are submitted usually every three days in writing. The assignments of MGB informants cover the same questions given K-5 informants, plus the following additional ones: Do you know of any Soviet officers who have German girlfriends, visit German homes and are trying to buy or already have bought civilian clothes on the German market? Because money is now hard to get, many Germans sell their clothes to Soviet officers and soldiers - do you know of such cases? Each informant is asked to name those German officials whom he knows well and is ordered to report on them: what they do, what they say, what they read. One informant, for instance, who once worked for K-5 in Anklam was asked to keep up good personal relationships with those who were still in K-5 and to report whether there is anything that K-5 tries to hide from the MGB officers and whether they speak critically either of MGB officers or of their work. - Pretty female MGB informants are also asked whether they have friends or relatives in Western Germany or in Berlin and whether they would be willing to accept a mission there. Those who comply are told that they will receive instructions from the MGB "chief" just prior to their departure. It is intimated that the "mission" is not to spy but merely to establish relationships with Western officers, and informants are told that the MGB will provide the Interzonal Pass, West Marks and suitable clothing. Each important session with the informant is terminated by the MGB with the remark that the informant should remember that he is under the jurisdiction of the Soviet army and should he break his pledge of silence or try to flee to Western Germany, he will be brought back and tried as a spy.

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officer of MGB Group in Greifswald, though his rank now appears to be Lt. Colonel.

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